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Tattlers and Trail Blazers: Attorneys' Liability for
Clien ts' Fraud
Barbara Black*
Unfortunately, newspaper accounts provide support for the view
that there has been a precipitous decline in professionalism. Even as the
fallout from the Enron-era corporate scandals works its way through the
courts, newspapers are filled with allegations of the most recent fraudthe backdating of employee stock options to guarantee that the recipients would profit from their exercise. While the story is still unfolding,
it appears that the practice was prevalent and resulted in inaccurate financial statements at many corporations. 1 Although to date no outside
counsel has been publicly implicated in the scandal, at least one general
counsel has been fired 2 and another has been indicted. 3 Today, the belief, once expressed by the Seventh Circuit, that professionals would not
sacrifice their reputations to further their clients' fraud sounds nai"ve. 4
In his article The Corporate/Securities Attomey as a "Moving Target"Client Fraud Dilemmas,s Professor Marc Steinberg demonstrates that
the tightening of ethics standards imposes greater responsibilities on attorneys who represent clients that engage in securities fraud, and, as he
observes, private claimants increasingly seek redress from attorneys for
damages caused by their clients' fraud. Indeed, some firms have paid
large amounts in settlement of these claims. 6 Courts, however, are skep* Professor and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
Many thanks to Professors Lissa Griffin and Steven H. Goldberg for their thoughtful comments on
this paper.
1. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday; Some CEOs Reap Millions by
Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable; Luck - Or Something Else?, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 18, 2006, at AI, available at http://online.wsj.comlpublidresources/documents/infooptionsscore06-full.htm (discussing corporations that have come under investigation for alleged
backdating).
2. Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: The Stock Options Backdating Probe, 235 N.Y.
L.J. 3 (2006) (firing of McAfee's general counsel); see also Ashby Jones, Tough Times for In-House
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,2006, at A12, available athttp://www.online.wsj.comlarticle_printl
SBI16095786440793402.htm.
3. See Beth Bar, Former Comverse Executives Confront Backdating Charges, 236 N.Y. L.J. 1
(2006).
4. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
5. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Corporate/Securities Attomey as a "Moving Target" - Oient
Fraud Dilemmas, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2006).
6. See In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (approving settlement that included Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP's payment of $19.5 million in partial settlement of claims); Nathan Koppel, Executives on Tnal: Lay Says 'Classic Run on Bank' Ruined Enron; Energy Firm's Outside Counsel Sits in the Cross Hairs of Lerach. Securities OassAction Kingpin, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2006, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle_print/
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tical, generally, about the deterrent value of private securities fraud
cases, express concern about the costs they impose on corporate defendants/ and, in particular, are suspicious of plaintiffs' efforts to recover
from deep-pocket secondary participants like attorneys.8 Congress has
also made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring securities fraud actions
by imposing rigorous pleading standards9 and preempting state law securities fraud class actions. lO It would not be surprising, therefore, to
find judicial reluctance to impose monetary liability on attorneys for
failing to confront their clients' fraud, particularly since judges well understand "that any significant increase in attorney liability to third parties could have a dramatic effect upon our entire system of legal ethics."l1 Professor Steinberg notes the contrast: Judge Sporkin, in an
administrative proceeding arising out of the savings and loan debacle,
famously asked why not one professional "blew the whistle" to stop the
fraud,12 while courts, in the context of private damages claims, frequently dismiss the notion that attorneys have a duty to "tattle" on their
clients.13 Rather, courts may believe, as expressed by the Seventh Circuit, "that an award of damages under the securities laws is not the way
to blaze the trail toward improved ethical standards in the legal ... profession[].,,14 Professor Steinberg's insightful analysis of the ethical rules
provides a useful opportunity to explore the state of the law on private
claims for damages for attorneys' breach of these duties.
The first part of this paper examines judicial treatment, after Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,15 of federal securities claims made by purchasers and sellers of securities alleging that
the issuer's attorney participated in the corporation's fraud. The second
part of the paper explores the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) Rules of Professional Conduct as a basis for malpractice claims

SB114592536742234763.html (law firms increasingly are targeted in securities suits); Matthew Goldstein, Going After the Lawyers in Refcos Stunning Fall, THESTREET.COM, Nov. 21, 2005,
http://www.thestreet.comlpf/markets/matthewgoldstein/10253733.html(regulators looking into role
law firm played in collapse of brokerage firm). Other instances are cited in Steinberg, supra note 5,
at 1 nn.2-3.
7. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of cases, restricted the private implied remedies under
the antifraud rules of the Securities Exchange Act because of its concerns about the special dangers
presented by frivolous claims. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES
LAW §§ 7.01-7.02 (3d ed. 2001).
8. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see
also discussion infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
9. For an overview of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) see STEINBERG,
supra note 7, § 7.12.
10. See discussion of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), infra notes 8889 and accompanying text.
11. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
12. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
13. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
14. Id

15. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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brought by or on behalf of the corporation itself against its attorneys for
failing to report fraud by the corporate management that injured the
corporation. The third part considers additional state law theories. I
conclude, in the fourth part, that the likelihood that courts will impose
liability on attorneys for involvement in their clients' fraud is not substantial.
I.

LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

Derived from its authorizing statute, § 10(b), which refers to "manipulative" and "deceptive" devices, Rule lOb-5 generally prohibits two
forms of securities fraud. Most cases of corporate fraud involve misrepresentations of material facts ("deception") and are covered by Rule
lOb-5(b). Other forms of securities fraud involving conduct and not
misrepresentations (e.g., classic stock manipulation) are picked up by
Rule lOb-5(a) and (c). In Central Bank, the Supreme Court, relying
principally on the statutory language, stated that there was no aiding
and abetting liability for any type of Rule 10b-5 fraud. The Court, however, reaffirmed that anyone, including attorneys and accountants, could
be liable for a Rule 10b-5 violation, "assuming all of the requirements
for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.,,16 Because the specific
allegations in Central Bank involved misrepresentations, the Court, in
particular, noted that recognition of aiding and abetting liability would
impermissibly dispense with a showing of plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's statementsP Since Central Bank, lower courts have grappled
with the dividing line between primary and secondary liability with respect to both types of Rule 10b-5 fraud.
Rule 10b-5(b) requires, first and foremost, a misstatement or ornission of a material fact. Omissions of material facts, however, do not
constitute Rule lOb-5 fraud unless there is a duty to disclose the information, and courts have been reluctant to recognize a disclosure duty
outside of a fiduciary relationship.18 Schatz v. Rosenberlf9 provides a
vivid illustration of this principle. In that case, plaintiffs sold their business to a buyer who later declared bankruptcy and defaulted on payment. They alleged that the law firm representing the buyer committed
fraud because it kept silent even though it knew of its client's insolvency. To bolster the claims, they introduced an opinion from the state
bar association that the attorney had an ethical duty either to disclose
the information or to withdraw from representation. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that the law
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 191.
Id at 180.
See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 4-5 & nn.18-21.
943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
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firm only "papered the deal" and did not participate in the negotiations.
Therefore, the lawyer did not make any misrepresentations, and, according to the court, his ethical obligation did not create a legal duty to
disclose under federal securities laws. 20
Perhaps the outcome in Schatz is correct, since the buyers could
not have had any reasonable expectation that the seller's attorney would
be looking out for them. After all, the transaction was a classic example
of arms-length bargaining. In contrast, where the plaintiffs are investing
in the enterprise, the argument can be made that the corporation's attorney does owe them a duty since the plaintiffs are becoming participants in a joint enterprise with the corporate client and, if the investment is stock, are also becoming the ultimate owners of the attorney's
client. An analogy can be found in classic insider trading liability under
Rule lOb-5, which is premised on a fiduciary relationship between the
shareholders (including purchasers, who by the transaction become
shareholders) and corporate insiders, including temporary insiders like
the corporate attorneys.21 Courts have not, however, distinguished
Schatzon this basis, and have not recognized a fiduciary relationship between an attorney representing a corporate client and its investors who
were misled by the corporation's public misstatements. 22 In order to be
liable, an attorney must make a misrepresentation of a material fact on
which investors relied. Rubin v.· Schottenstein, Zox & DumP provides
a useful contrast with Schatz. In that case the attorney for the corporation in which the plaintiffs were investing told them that everything was
"fine" with the bank, when, in fact, as the attorney knew, the plaintiffs'
investment would constitute a default under the corporation's loan
agreement with the bank. The Sixth Circuit, reversing the lower court's
summary judgment for the attorney, held that liability could be imposed
on the attorney for his voluntary disclosure of false information, not because of any fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the investors. 24

20. Id. at 487-89, 497.
21. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655
n.14 (1983).
22. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989) (holding that attorneys for the bond issuer's
underwriters had no duty to discover and disclose fraud to the purchasers of the bonds); Greenberg
Traurig of N.Y., P.e. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 80 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that a law firm had no
duty to investigate and disclose to investors adverse information about the CEO and the corporation). In contrast, the corporation's general counsel, who remained silent when the CEO misrepresented the corporation's financial condition to suppliers, could be liable for negligent misrepresentations under state law; he owed them a duty to disclose because of the confidence they placed in him
because of his position. Schnelling v. Budd, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193 (D. Nev. 2003).
23. 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
24. Id at 265-66; see also Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1491 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the attorney who contracted to provide custodial services and made misrepresentations
about the collateral was liable to plaintiffs, who were third party beneficiaries of the contract).
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Accordingly, in the context of a law firm's representation of a corporate client, where the attorneys assist in the preparation of SEC filings and other communications to the public, a critical issue 25 after Central Bank is whether the attorney made a misstatement. Lower courts
are struggling to develop a workable test for identifying primary violators. The Second Circuit, in Wright v. Brost & Young, L.L.p.,26 adopted
a "bright-line" rule: a secondary actor could not be liable unless the misstatement was "attributed to [him] at the time of its dissemination," because, in its view, reliance on a misstatement necessarily entails knowledge of the speaker's identity.27 Under the "bright-line" rule, attorneys
will not be held liable where the only allegations are that they "played a
significant role in drafting, creating, reviewing or editing allegedly
fraudulent letters or press releases,,,28 and there are no allegations that
there were misstatements attributable to the law firm that were disseminated to the plaintiffs or the investing public.29 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit has stated that it is sufficient to establish a defendant's liability if
he has substantially participated in the preparation of the fraudulent
statements, even if that preparation did not lead to his actual making of
the misstatements. 3o
Thus, the positions taken by the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are at opposite ends of the spectrum. The Second Circuit takes the
requirement of reliance to an extreme by requiring knowledge of the
identity of the speaker, and the Ninth Circuit essentially renames the
"substantial assistance" test for aiding and abetting as "substantial participation." Klein v. Boyd,31 a Third Circuit opinion that was vacated
pending an en banc rehearing that never occurred, set forth a middle
ground. It held that when the attorney plays a substantial role in the

25. In addition, (1) the defendant must act with scienter, Ernst & Erost v. Hochfelder,425 U.S.
185,193 (1976); (2) the defendant must know, or at least should have known, that his misstatement
would be disseminated to investors, Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod, Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir.
1996); (3) the plaintiffs must rely on the misstatement, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994); and (4) the misstatement must cause the injury, Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2005). Cases holding that attorneys may be liable
for misstatements in opinion letters that were provided to investors include Kline v. First W Gov't
Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) and Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
26. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
27. Id. at 175.
28. Ziemba v. Cascade In!'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 2001).
29. A district court in the Second Circuit announced a modified version of the bright-line test in
In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319,331 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), holding that the accounting firm could be liable, even though not identified in the document, when it helped to create
the false statements and the firm's role as the corporation's auditor was well known to investors.
30. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2(00); In re Software
Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Wenneman v. Bf{. wn, 49 F. Supp. 2d
1283 (D. Utah 1999) (finding allegations that a law firm drafted documents in connection with a
scheme to sell unregistered shares sufficient to allege primary liability).
31. [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,136 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), vacated
pending rehearing en bane, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,165 (3d Cir. Mar. 9,
1998). Because the parties settled, the en banc hearing never occurred.
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creation of a document that is disseminated to investors, he can be considered its author or co-author if he knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that investors will rely on the statement and is aware (or is reckless
in not being aware) that the document contains a material misstatement
or omission. The lawyer speaking "behind the scenes" is subject to the
duty to speak truthfully, even though the document is not attributed to
him. 32
Until recently, courts did not have much occasion to focus on
claims brought under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), where the gravamen of the
securities fraud is conduct and not misrepresentations. But, perhaps as
a consequence of Wright, plaintiffs are now more frequently alleging
wide ranging fraudulent schemes. 33 The Second Circuit, in SEC v. U.S.
Environmental, Inc.,34 held that a broker who followed the directions of
a stock promoter and executed stock trades to further the promoter's
manipulative scheme could be primarily liable for stock manipulation so
long as he knew (or was reckless in not knowing) that the trades were
manipulative, even if he did not share the promoter's specific purpose to
manipulate the market for that stock. The court distinguished the broker from defendants who were not found primarily liable in other cases:
the broker did not simply fail to disclose information when he had no
duty to do so, or fail to prevent another party from engaging in a fraudulent act when there was no duty to prevent it. Instead, he engaged in
manipulative conduct. 35
U.S. Environmentalthus suggests that corporate attorneys could be
held liable for their substantial participation in a corporate fraud if the
claim is based on conduct and not misrepresentations. Just as stock
brokers can commit fraud by knowingly executing phony trades, lawyers
can commit fraud by knowingly advising their clients, and drafting the
documentation, for phony transactions. However, the Supreme Court
has sent conflicting messages about what constitutes proscribed conduct
under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,36 a
private claim for damages, it defined "manipulation" narrowly, viewing
it as virtually a term of art;37 by contrast, in SEC v. Zandford,38 an en-

32. Chavin v. McKelvey, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,325 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 29, 1998); see also Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that primary liability did not require identification of the maker of the misrepresentation).
33. The elements under these paragraphs are: "(1) committed a deceptive or manipulative act,
(2) [made] with scienter, that (3) the act affected the market for securities or was otherwise in connection with their purchase or sale, and that (4) defendants' actions caused the plaintiffs' injuries."
In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
34. 155 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1998).
35. Id at 112.
36. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
37. Id at 473.
38. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
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forcement action, it viewed manipulative conduct more expansively.
The trial in In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA
Litigatiod9 is scheduled to begin in spring 2007 and may bring the issue
of attorneys' liability to center stage. Purchasers of Enron securities
filed this securities fraud class action against a number of defendants,
including several law firms. The trial court previously denied a motion
to dismiss the complaint against one law firm, Vinson & Elkins, but
granted the motion as to Kirkland & Ellis.40 While the court described
Enron as a Ponzi scheme and discussed generally liability based on conduct, its decision focused on liability based on misrepresentations. In
doing so, it relied heavily on a "co-creator" test as explicated by the
SEC in its amicus brief. Specifically, the court found that an attorney
could be held liable "if he or she writes misrepresentations for inclusion
in a document to be given to investors, even if the idea ... came from
someone else,,,41 and even if the statement is not publicly attributed to
him.
The court's middle-ground position is made clear in its discussion
of the allegations against Vinson & Elkins. It strongly suggested that
allegations that the law firm had to know of the ongoing fraud, that it
structured and provided advice on illicit transactions, and that it chose
to engage in illegal activity for lucrative fees were insufficient to impose
liability on the law firm. What made the law firm's involvement more
than "substantial participation" was the allegation that the law firm
drafted many of the public statements about Enron's business and financial situation. "[I]n light of its alleged voluntary, essential, material,
and deep involvement as a primary violator in the ongoing Ponzi
scheme, Vinson & Elkins was not merely a drafter, but essentially a coauthor of the documents created for public consumption concealing [the
fraud].,,42 The court, however, dismissed the complaint as to Kirkland
& Ellis, finding that it only alleged the performance of routine legal services for some of the Enron-controlled entities. Specifically, the law
firm "never made any material misrepresentations or omissions to investors or the public generally.,,43

39. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). On November 1, 2006, the Fifth Circuit agreed to
hear an appeal from several defendants, including Vincent & Elkins, challenging the district court's
class-action certification. See Chron.com, Around the Region, http://www.chron.comJdisp/story.mpl!
business!4327099.html (last visited Nov. 18,2006).
40. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (granting motion to dismiss as to Kirkland & Ellis). The law firm subsequently settled for $13.5 million.
See Update on UC's Enron Investments and Lawsuits - University of California News Room,
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edulnews/enronl (last visited Nov. 18,2006).
41. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
42. Id. at 705.
43. Id. at 706. The court subsequently dismissed claims against another law firm that performed services for Enron and related entities for similar reasons. See In re Enron Corp., No. H-013624,2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39927 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5,2005).
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Therefore, at least according to the Enron court, attorneys can be
liable when their substantial participation in the clients' fraud includes
crafting public misstatements on which the public relies, without the necessity of identifying them as the maker of those statements. Whether
the Fifth Circuit will adopt this legal test awaits another day (assuming
that the trial goes forward and evidence provides sufficient support for
the allegations).
The collapse of Parmalat, the Italian Enron, has produced a series
of opinions in the Southern District of New York exploring theories of
primary liability.44 After the corporation's insolvency, investors brought
suit against the banks, accounting firms, and law firm, seeking to hold
them liable, under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), for their role in structuring
and participating in a series of complex sham transactions to improve
the corporation's bottom line. 45 Plaintiffs alleged that the law firm,
which was set up to act as Parmalat's New York office, was the "nerve
center" of the fraud and that its attorneys used their legal skills to design
and perpetrate the transactions that comprised the fraudulent scheme.
Specifically, Parmalat engaged in fictitious transactions with two shell
companies that were "created and controlled by" the corporation's principal attorney.46 The court held that these allegations were sufficient to
state a claim of primary liabilityY
Difficult questions remaiq after the Parmalat cases. While painstakingly drawing a distinction between the two forms of securities fraud
under Rule lOb-5, the court provides little guidance on how to apply the
distinction. While both Enron and Parmalat involved massive, complex
and pervasive financial frauds (both have been referred to as Ponzi
schemes) that are distinct from the cases involving garden-variety misrepresentations in press releases or SEC filings, the distinction between
fraud as conduct and fraud as misrepresentations is elusive. In addition,
Parmalat does not provide much guidance on when participation in a
scheme becomes so substantial that the participant can be said to be
"using or employing" a deceptive device, the statutory language the
court focused on.48 While the judge admonished that basing liability on
conduct is not an "end-run" around Wright, the two lines of cases seem

44. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the liability
of the banks); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the liability
of the accountants); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the
liability of the law firm).
45. Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants made false and misleading public statements under Rule lOb-5(b), but the court dismissed these claims because of the bright-line rule of Wright.
46. Parmalat, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26.
47. Id. at 627; see also In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that accounting firm may be liable under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) as the architect and creator of the accounting schemes used to inflate the company's financials).
48. For example, even the classic manipulative scheme in u.s. Environmental involves at least
an implicit misrepresentation that the trade is a bona fide transaction.
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on a collision course. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit disagrees with the
Parmalat court's expansive view of fraudulent conduct. In its view, the
only form of fraudulent conduct covered by Rule 10b-5 is stock manipulation; thus, unless the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a misrepresentation or engaged in stock manipulation, he cannot be liable
under Rule lOb_5. 49
While the causes for the massive and brazen frauds like Enron,
Parmalat, Worldcom, et alia, are many and varied, elimination of aiding
and abetting liability as a deterrent surely played a part. 50 Whether the
attempts by some lower courts to broaden the category of primary violators will survive review by the Supreme Court remains to be seen. The
best solution would be a congressional amendment allowing aiding and
abetting liability in private actions. The failure of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to provide additional remedies for defrauded investors is one of the
legislation's significant failings. 51
II.

ArrORNEY MALPRACTICE

Professor Steinberg analyzes the SEC Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set forth
minimum standards of professional conduct for securities attorneys.52
While the adoption of these Rules engendered much debate and consternation, the obligations they impose on outside counsel are neither
novel nor onerous. The Rules set forth the incontrovertible proposition
that the attorney owes his professional and ethical duties to the corporate entity.53 They do not impose any duty on the attorney to investigate whether his client is engaged in fraud. They do not require the attorney to report any fraud outside the corporation. Rather, the attorney
cannot close his eyes when he becomes aware of corporate fraud. He
must report it to the corporation's chief legal officer (CLO) in the first
instance, and if the CLO's response is unsatisfactory, he must continue
to report up the ladder. What triggers the reporting obligation "is the
gateway to the entire set of obligations created by the SEC rules,,,54 and
unfortunately the SEC drafted a virtually incomprehensible definition,
49. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2006).
SO. Prior to Central Bank, courts imposed liability on both lawyers and accountants for aiding
and abetting. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 760 (5th ed. 2006).
51. The only provision enhancing private remedies is the increased period for the statute of
limitation. 15 U.S.c. § 78aa-l(a) (1994).
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2005).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (2005); see also United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153, 2004 WL
1672880, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004) (refusing to dismiss indictment against a lawyer who assisted
executives in manipulating corporate earnings and charging him with depriving the corporation of
"honest services" in violation of mail and fraud statutes).
54. George M. Cohen, Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Defective Trigger of SEC Rule
Implementing Sarbanes-Oxley's Duty to Report, 73 U.S.L.w. (BNA) 2419,2422 (2005).
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complete with a double negative. If, in furtherance of his professional
responsibilities, the attorney becomes aware of "evidence of a material
violation" by the corporation or any of its officers, directors, employees
or agents, he must report it. 55 "Evidence of a matenal violation means
credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under
the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to OCCUr.,,56 Unfortunately, in the words of three
law professors who were deeply involved in the rule-making process,
"[t]he double-negative formulation makes the standard difficult to understand, interpret or apply.,,57
In this section I examine whether attorneys could be held liable to
the corporate client for failing to report management fraud. The elements of a claim for attorney malpractice are generally stated as follows:
"(1) the duty to use such skill, prudence and diligence as members of the
profession commonly possess; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a proximate
connection between the breach and the injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage. ,,58 Many commentators assume that attorneys who do not report up the ladder could be found liable for malpractice59 and would be
liable for damages caused to the entity if he breaches the duty he owes
to his client to bring evidence of fraud to the attention of its highest
governing body, so that the fraud can be stopped and further damage to
the corporation averted. The question, however, is not free from doubt.
The first obstacle is that Section 205.7 specifically states that the
Rules do not create a private right of action against any attorney "based
upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions," and that authority to enforce compliance with the Rules is vested exclusively with
the SEC. 60 The SEC stated throughout the public comment process that
it did not intend that the Rules would create any private right of action. 61 While the implication of a private cause of action is a judicial determination based on legislative intent, the agency relied on comments
from the sponsors of the provision that this was the intent of Congress. 62

55. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (2005).
56. Id. § 205.2( e). "Material violation," in turn, is defined at 17 c.F.R. § 205.2(i).
57. Cohen, supra note 54, at 2419.
58. See, e.g., Loyd v. Paine Webber, Inc., 208 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating California
law).
59. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 181 (2002); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud.' See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL'y 195, 224 (2003). The most thoughtful pre-Enron analysis of this issue is found at
George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm
to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
597 (1998).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2005).
61. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release
No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI86,823, at 87,110 (Jan. 29, 2003).
62. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Re-
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In the public comment process, suggestions were made for a safe harbor
to protect lawyers from liability when they attempted in good faith to
comply with the rules. The SEC went beyond this and adopted Section
205.7 that extends to both compliance and non-compliance so that it
would be "truly effective."63 Its commentary also specifically stated that
the safe harbor "is intended to preclude, among other things, private injunctive actions seeking to compel persons to take actions under this
part and private damages actions against such persons.,,64
While defendants in any malpractice suits will certainly rely on Section 205.7, it remains an open question whether this defense will prevail.
Section 205.7 is limited to precluding private damages claims based on
the SEC rules and is consistent with the generally accepted view that an
ethics rule violation by itself does not create a cause of action. 65 Section
205.7, however, should not bar claims based on common law negligence
or state law malpractice claims where the violation of Section 205.7
should be admissible as evidence of the breach of the attorney's duty of
care. Clients may sue their attorneys whenever the attorney has negligently breached a duty of care owed to the client that resulted in monetary harm. An attorney's failure to detect and report management fraud
violates the duty of care the attorney owes to the client. This duty of
care is inherent in the attorney-client relationship, predates adoption of
the SEC rules and exists independently of them. The SEC Rules simply
provide further evidence of the standard of care expected from corporate attorneys.
In the release accompanying the final rules, the SEC referred to the
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers and the ABA Model
Rules, both of which state that violations of the professional conduct
rules do not create "an implied cause of action for professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty.,,66 Significantly, the SEC did not refer to the last sentence of the Model Rule provision: "Nevertheless,
since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard
of conduct.,,67 Whether or not it was intended by the SEC, the omission
of similar language may be interpreted as a signal from the agency that
the SEC Rules should play no role in malpractice claims. This position
lease. No. 46868, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 86,802, at 86,553 (Nov. 21,
2(02).
63. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Release.
No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 86,823, at 87,098 (Jan. 29, 2(03)
[hereinafter Final Release].
64. Id.. The SEC also specifically referred to the safe harbor when it addressed a likely increase
in malpractice insurance premiums as a cost of the regulation. Id. at 87,101.
65. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 2 LEGAL MALPRACfICE § 19.7, at 1212
(2006).
66. Final Release, supra note 63, at 87,098.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer, preface (2002).
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is contrary to the weight of authority that holds that a violation of a professional conduct rule is admissible and at least relevant to prove the
breach of the standard of care. 68 While ultimately the issue is for the
courts, the SEC appears to be actively discouraging the use of Section
205.7 to establish a standard of care.
The courts may share the SEC's reticence. Judicial alarm over an
increasing number of legal malpractice claims can lead to, in the words
of one commentator, unjustified protectiveness toward lawyers. 69 Like
the SEC, courts show a disinclination to recognize the breach of ethics
standards as a basis of liability.1° They reason that the ethics rules were
not adopted for the purpose of providing a remedy in civil litigation and
may also reflect a concern that juries may be. unduly swayed to impose
liability on an "unethical" attorney.71 Schatz, for example, held that an
ethical duty to withdraw from representation or disclose information to
a third party did not create a corresponding legal duty under federal securities laws. n
To date, most of the few relevant cases73 stem from the savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s, when the federal regulators pursued claims
against law firms that represented failed financial institutions to recoup
losses caused by management fraud?4 Two of these cases are particularly relevant today.
In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers,75 the Ninth Circuit held that the
law firm that represented a failed savings and loan association (S&L)
could be liable to the S&L's receiver for malpractice because it failed to
uncover management fraud in the course of its representation of the client in connection with two estate syndications. Part of its engagement
was to perform a due diligence review to confirm the accuracy and completeness of the disclosures in the private placement memoranda. Starting with the basic proposition that "it is an attorney's duty to protect his
client in every possible way,,,76 the court held that the law firm could be
liable to its client if it was negligent in failing to detect and report that
management was cooking the books and misrepresenting the S&L's fi-

68. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 4.1, at 4·6
(3d ed. Supp. 2002); see also MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 65, at 1217. Some commentators go further in minimizing the significance of the disclaimer. See Harris, supra note 59; David B.Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 806 n.25 (1992).
69. See also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 68, § 4.10, at 4-29 - 4-30.
70. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
71. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 65, § 19.7, at 1211-19.
72. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
73. Harris attributes the paucity of caselaw to the propensity of attorneys to settle these claims.
Harris, supra note 59, at 636. Koniak attributes it to the reluctance of corporate managers to sue law
firms. Koniak, supra note 59, at 224.
74. For a more extensive discussion of the cases, see Harris, supra note 59, at 619-32.
75. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
76. Id. at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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nancial condition.
While many subsequent decisions distinguish
O'Melveny & Myers by finding that other attorneys had a more limited
engagement that did not include a duty to investigate,77 none challenges
the proposition that an attorney who uncovers evidence of management
fraud is committing malpractice if he does not report up the ladder.
FDIC v. Clark's provides a more specific discussion of what constitutes attorney negligence. The bank's management perpetrated a fraud
that involved the purchase of stolen money through loans procured
through the bank. The jury found two instances where the attorneys,
partners in a law firm, had received sufficient notice of the fraud that
they should have investigated further. One attorney received a complaint that was filed against the bank about irregularities in its loan procedures; another attorney negotiated a settlement of the lawsuit. Moreover, neither attorney adequately informed the board of directors about
this law suit. There was evidence that had the directors been fully informed they would have conducted an investigation and would have discovered the fraud. Applying Colorado law that "(a)n attorney owes his
client a duty to employ that degree of knowledge, skill, and judgment
ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession,"79 the court
found that this evidence supported a verdict of negligence. 8o
The FDIC, which acts as the receiver for failed S&L's, was the
plaintiff in both O'Melveny & Myers and Clark. Outside of this situation, there have been few malpractice suits, suggesting reluctance on the
part of management to pursue these claims. Because state corporate
law limits the situations where shareholders can bring derivative suits to
pursue corporate claims,81 it is unlikely that there will be very many
malpractice suits brought by or on behalf of the corporation.
III.

OTHER STATE THEORIES

Investors may seek to hold attorneys responsible under additional
state law theories: negligent misrepresentations and secondary liability.82 Attorneys may be liable if, in the course of their representation of
their client, they made negligent misrepresentations to investors. Ac-

77. See. e.g., Loyd v. Paine Webber, Inc., 208 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that attorneys do not have a general duty to investigate whether his client is engaged in fraud).
78. 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992); see also BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964
F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1997) (discussing a corporation's negligence claims against its attorneys).
79. Clark, 978 F.2d at 1550 (quoting Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985».
80. See In re Am. Cont'! Corp.lLincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D.
Ariz. 1992) ("An attorney who represents a corporation has a duty to act in the corporation's best
interest when confronted by adverse interests of directors, officers, or corporate affiliates.").
81. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
82. For discussion of state securities law theories, see Marc I. Steinberg & Chris Claassen, Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws: Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.I.
1 (2005).
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cording to section 552(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.83

Case law, however, exhibits a general disinclination to impose liability
for negligent misrepresentations unless the defendant had a special duty
to use care to make accurate representations. Thus, liability will be imposed only on those persons who possess unique or specialized expertise
or who are in a special position of confidence or trust with the injured
party.84 In Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine,85 for example, the
court held that attorneys who reviewed and revised an offering circular
could be liable for negligent misrepresentations to those buyers who relied on it, provided that they knew or should have known that the investors would be shown the offering circular.
In addition, investors may be able to pursue secondary liability
claims against attorneys under state law. In Greenberg Traurig of New
York, p.e v. Moody,86 a law firm performed legal services for a corporation whose CEO repeatedly violated a permanent injunction against
the sale of unregistered securities. The appellate court, reversing a jury
verdict against the law firm because of numerous errors, followed the
prevailing law and held that the law firm owed no duty to disclose the
fraud to the investors. It did hold, however, that the law firm could be
liable for conspiracy to defraud the investors for its role in assisting the
corporation in its efforts to obtain additional financing, when it knew
that the many securities violations committed by the CEO and the corporation were undisclosed. 87 The attorneys argued that they were unaware of their client's past securities violations; however, given the seriousness of these violations, Greenberg Traurig suggested that the
attorneys should have investigated their client before undertaking to
represent it. When the CEO has a lifetime ban on selling unregistered

83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977); see also, e.g., Maliner v. Wachovia
Bank, No. 04-60237CIV, 2005 WL 670293, *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1,2005) (allowing plaintiff's negligent
misrepresentation claim against portfolio manager).
84. Expertise alone may not be enough. See Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421,
1431 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressing "unwilling[ness) to hold that in every case wherein someone with
expertise is hired a fiduciary relationship is created.").
85. 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991).
86. 161 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App. 2004); see also Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d
756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that a claim was stated against law firm as a co-conspirator and for
aiding and abetting its client's breach of fiduciary duty).
87. Greenberg Traurig, 161 S.W.3d at 102; see also Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988)
(holding that attorney who advised limited partnership on private placement could be liable to a purchaser under state securities law for materially aiding the sale of unregistered securities, unless he
could establish a reasonable care defense).
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securities, the only representation the securities lawyer should be offering is an effort to rescind the prohibition.
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),
however, severely limits the effectiveness of these state law claims since
it preempts class actions based on untrue statements or omissions of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of most publicly
traded securities. 88 Congress enacted SLUSA because it was concerned
that plaintiffs' attorneys could avoid the strictures of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) by bringing securities class actions
in state court. Therefore, unless there are individual investors whose
damages are considerable, it is not economically feasible 89 for plaintiffs
to bring state law misrepresentations or omissions claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Judicial efforts to expand primary liability after Central Bank and
the congressional directive to the SEC to adopt Rules of Professional
Conduct stem from the Enron-era corporate scandals and the public's
disgust that highly-paid lawyers were allegedly involved in every aspect
of the sham transactions that deceived the marketplace. If in fact lawyers are exposed to a greater risk of liability, they have brought it on
themselves.
Moreover, private actions may be necessary for adequate enforcement of attorneys' professional responsibilities. There is concern in
some quarters that state disciplinary proceedings are ineffectual in enforcing professional responsibilities where large corporate law firms are
concerned. 90 While the SEC's Enforcement Division recently has
brought a number of enforcement proceedings against lawyers who have
played some role in their clients' fraud,91 it is the Office of the General
Counsel that is responsible for enforcing the Rules of Professional Conduct, and to date there are no reports of SEC enforcement of its Rules.
So how likely is it that courts will impose liability on attorneys for
damages caused by their clients' fraud? In my opinion, courts do not
appear enthusiastic about using damages awards to "blaze the trail to-

88. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.). The Supreme Court, in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Snlith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006), made clear it would interpret SLUSA
expansively.
89. SLUSA also permits a class of no more than 50 plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)(J).
90. See Koniak, supra note 59, at 215.
91. See Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: The Themes
of Sarbanes·Oxley as Reflected in the Commission's Enforcement Program (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech]spch092004smc.htm. For a critical assessment of the SEC's
actions, see Lewis D. Lowenfels, Alan R. Bromberg, & Michael J. Sullivan, Attorneys as Gatekeep.
ers: SEC Actions Against Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. ToL. L. REV. 877 (2006).
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ward improved ethical standards.,,92 While some law firms have paid
large amounts to settle these claims, the payments may be based on a
desire to hush up the matter rather than an assessment of the probability of plaintiffs' recovery. We must await further developments to see if
the Enron and Parmalat cases result in new law in this area. Furthermore, at this time the extent of attorneys' involvement in the backdating
scandal is unknown. Unfortunately, as with the S&L scandals of the
1980's, this chapter in attorney regulation may close without significant
improvement in attorneys' professional responsibilities. 93

92. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Ox/ey: Legis/ating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure 6
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-14), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=899593 (arguing that "it will become even easier for lawyers who wish to
turn a blind eye to client misconduct to do so").
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